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ABSTRACT
In this paper, it is argued that there can be necessary and non-natural desires. After a discus-
sion about what seems wrong with such desires, Epicurus’ classification of desires is treated 
similarly to Kripke’s treatment of the Kantian table of judgments. A sample of three cases is 
suggested to make this point.




There are impossible desires, those that cannot be satisfied due to physical limitations: flying 
like a bird, teleporting to the other side of the world, and the like. But this paper will talk about 
conceptual impossibilities, that is, whatever cannot be thought of by definition. Let us see why it is 
largely assumed that there are also conceptually impossible desires.
Epicurean desires
After describing Epicurus’ classification of desires, we will focus on his assumed opposition 
between necessity and vanity.
Analogy I: Modal tables
Due to its connection with epistemological concepts like belief, will, or intention, desire has 
been studied as a modality of a ion impa ing on human judgment (see, e.g., Gardiès, 1979). Like 
necessity or knowledge, desire can be studied as a proper, “boulic” modality of judgment.
There also seems to be a structural analogy between epistemic and boulic modalities, based 
on the distinction between subjective and objective contents of judgment. The objective part is 
expressed by the concept of knowledge, which makes the transition from belief to truth through 
justification; in the same way, the objective part of desire is expressed by the concept of will, which 
transitions from desire to reality through intention. Table 1 helps to see this analogy in a clearer way. 
The sort of impossibility on which I want to focus is not located in the object of desire; 
rather, it relates to inconceivability and lies at a definitional level. A look at Epicurus’ theory of 
desire may throw some light upon it.
Necessity and Vanity 
In his Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus makes a distinction between good and bad desires. 
According to him, there are three sorts of desire: natural and necessary desires; natural and 
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non-necessary desires; and vain desires. The first category 
splits into three different goals: happiness (eudaimonia); bodi-
ly well-being (aochlèsia); and life for itself (survival means). 
The second category corresponds to merely natural desires 
that can be di ensed with: sexual a ivities, pleasures of the 
table, and the like. The third category of desires is considered 
to be the source of pain and an unhappy life: avidity, anger, 
thirst for power, etc. Epicurus strongly advises us to avoid 
these bad desires because they are “devoid” (kenai) or empty 
desires. These are the most important in what follows, due to 
their radical opposition to necessary desires: quests for power, 
riches, or honour are said to be “empty” desires insofar as they 
do not have a proper end. 
Vanity against necessity!
This statement may seem difficult to accept for anyone 
who has not studied theoretical philosophy: who can claim 
that power, riches, and honour are not frequent targets in 
our everyday life? Who has never dreamt about seducing the 
prettiest boy or girl in one’s class, or becoming the president 
of one’s state? Of course, Epicurus would reply that such de-
sires are not “empty” in the sense of having no finality. Rather, 
the trouble with these vain desires is their self-growing and 
endless development: they can never be fully satisfied, inso-
far as their temporary satisfa ion always leads to other, more 
demanding desires. For this reason, Epicurus urges us to re-
nounce to them because attempting to fulfil them completely 
is a vain project. In this re ect, the third category of desires 
corresponds to the sort of impossible desires mentioned at the 
beginning of the paper. 
Vanity for necessity?
And yet, a capitalist-friendly agent could reply that the 
self-cumulative feature of vain desires is a virtue: just as Prot-
e ants bless a sense of effort and hardworking behaviour, it 
might be replied to Epicurus that nothing great can be accom-
plished without obstinacy. Or even that the criterion of ascet-
icism for a good life is just a bad excuse for lazy losers. Here is 
where Epicureans depart from capitalists, roughly  eaking: 
vain desires are vicious for the former; while they are virtuous 
for the latter. Pleasure is not the whole story.
Therefore, the controversy lies in the moral value of 
necessity and finiteness: according to the Epicureans, good 
desires are those that can be satisfied within the limits of 
human nature; knowledge of this nature is a precondition 
of happiness. 
Is there any sort of sufficient reason behind such a classi-
fication of desires? Let us try to tackle this issue, even to chal-
lenge the Epicurean taxonomy of desires.
Non-Epicurean desires
First, let us consider the way in which Epicurus came 
to his famous classification. Then let us see how far it can be 
altered in a relevant way.
A combinatorial picture 
Two basic elements are used by Epicurus, namely, nat-
uralness and necessity. A combination of both results in the 
three above kinds of desires; however, a pure combination 
of the two elements should yield not three but, rather, four 
elements. Let Na and Ne be symbols for naturalness and ne-
cessity, re ectively. Then the powerset of the basic set of 
desires D = {Ne, Na} is P(D) = {{Ne,Na}, {Ne}, {Na}, {}}. 
The first subset {Ne,Na} is the set of both necessary and 
natural desires, whilst the third {Na} is the set of natural and 
not necessary desires. Somehow ironically, the fourth subset 
of “empty”, i.e., neither necessary nor natural desires, corre-
sponds to the empty subset {}. As for the second element 
{Ne}, it is never mentioned in Epicurus’ theory of desire: the 
subset of necessary and not natural desires. Admittedly, phi-
losophers will mostly reply that such a combinatorial pic-
ture presents a typically anachronistic reading that is both 
immaterial and misleading for any serious philosophical in-
vestigation. But does it?
Our initial question about whether there are concep-
tually impossible desires can thus be reformulated as fol-
lows: can there be desires that are both necessary and not 
natural? A momentary reflection should be sufficient to 
answer negatively; but this is just the beginning of the in-
vestigation: the point is not to rely upon commonsensical 
beliefs but, rather, to find their roots and see how these can 
be relevantly questioned.
Epistemic modalities Boulic modalities
objective knowledge will




Table 1. An analogy between epistemic and boulic modalities.
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Analogy II: Kantian table
An analogy between two sorts of modalities was drawn 
above. The same can be drawn between Epicurean desires and 
Kantian judgments (in Kant, 2007 [1781]), despite their as-
sumed difference in nature. At the same time, the comparison 
made by Gardiès (1979) between epistemic and aboulic mo-
dalities refers to two kinds of judgment. Could desire be viewed 
as a  ecial sort of judgment? Or should so-called boulic mo-
dalities be restricted to the sole case of will, i.e., the objective 
part of desire? In fact, the following analogy does not need to 
fulfill the condition that desires be proper sorts of judgment. 
For analogy differs from identity: an analogy consists in say-
ing that whatever holds for a with re ect to b also holds for 
c with re ect to d, even if there is no logical interconnection 
between the elements of the pairs a,b and c,d. For our present 
concerns, let a and b be symbols for the Epicurean necessary 
and natural desires, re ectively; and let c and d be symbols for 
the Kantian analytic and a priori judgments. The same table 
(Table 2) appears as with the previous analogical table (Table 
1) of epistemic and boulic modalities, accordingly:
Epicurean desires Kantian judgments
(1) necessary analytic
(2) not necessary synthetic
(3) natural a priori
(4) not natural a posteriori
Table 2. An analogy between Epicurus’ classification of desires 
and Kant’s classification of judgments.
Epicurean desires Kantian judgments
(1) necessary, natural analytic, a priori
(2) necessary, cultural analytic, a posteriori
(3) contingent, natural synthetic, a priori
(4) contingent, cultural synthetic, a posteriori
Table 3. An analogy between Epicurus’ forbidden desires and 
Kant’s forbidden judgments. 
This combination seems meaningless, indeed, given that 
culture is the domain par excellence of contingent things like 
habits, norms, or taboos. Nevertheless, such an idea is not more 
absurd than the hypothesis of analytic a posteriori judgments. 
Table 3 can be qualified in two opposite ways: by re-
stricting, extending, or squarely cancelling its valid combi-
nations.
Restriction of Kant’s table
According to Kant (2007 [1781], B15-16), the judg-
ment “7 + 5 = 12” is both synthetic and a priori: it is synthet-
ic because it is not analytic, insofar as the predicate concept 
“equal to 12” is not contained within the subject concept “7 
+ 5”; it is a priori, because the justification of such a predi-
cation does not depend upon experience. The main problem 
concerns what Kant meant with “analyticity”: a containment 
relation between subject and predicate in a judgment. How 
can it be warranted that the number 12 contains the sum of 7 
and 5? What is the source of such a relation? 
A controversy arose at the end of the 19th century be-
tween those who took logic to ground mathematics (e.g., 
Frege, 1980 [1884]; Carnap, 1947) and those who did not 
(e.g., Poincaré, 1968 [1902]). According to the former, “7 + 5 
= 12” is not a synthetic but, rather, an analytic a priori judg-
ment: the concept “7 + 5” is taken to be necessarily identical 
to the concept “12”. Like Kant, this assumes a connection be-
tween arithmetic and apriority: no such justification can stem 
from the domain of experience, given that it is in principle not 
possible to find counterevidence against what is grounded a 
priori, i.e., universally. Against Kant, the concept of analytici-
ty has been separated from the criterion of containment and 
updated by the logical positivists: an analytical judgment is a 
judgment that is true by definition, according to the meanings 
given to its terms in a given language. This more conventional 
definition helps to avoid the psychologist connotation of ana-
lyticity. Above all, it shows how a controversy can be raised in 
philosophy with a redefinition of its main concepts. Why not 
do the same with the Epicurean table of desires? 
Extension of Kant’s table
According to Kripke (1980), there is no restriction at 
all in the Kantian table of judgments: each row constitutes a 
proper judgment on its own, including the case of necessary a 
posteriori judgments. Again, a prior redefinition of the basic 
terms is required to go from a negative to a positive reception 
of Kripke’s strategy. The same should apply to an extension of 
Epicurus’ table of desires.
Take Kripke’s famous case of analytic a posterio-
ri judgment: “Water is H
2
O”. Strictly speaking, “analytic” 
should be replaced by “necessary” in Kripke’s terminolo-
gy; and “judgment” should be turned interchangeably into 
“proposition” or “sentence”. How can such a sentence be 
true in every case, anyway? 
Note that Kantian judgments are lexicalized by posi-
tive concepts, unlike some of the Epicurean desires. How-
ever, it is not difficult to find positive counterparts to “not 
necessary” and “not natural”: contingent, for the former; 
cultural, for the latter. Consequently, our main issue can be 
reformulated as follows: can there be desires that are both 
necessary and cultural? 
An obvious similarity arises between the way in which 
Epicurus and Kant made use of their re ective concepts: 
there are three and only three possible combinations, in both 
cases. This is displayed in Table 3, where the same shaded row 
(2) is ruled out by the two theories.
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Firstly, Kripke proposes a redefinition of analyticity in 
terms of necessary truth, i.e., truth in every possible world. 
Whether “possible” is to be taken in the same sense as “con-
ceivable” or not is not at issue now, despite the close connec-
tion between conceivability and our issue of conceptually 
impossible desires. 
Second, Kripke’s point is that there are some sentences 
that are both necessary and based on experience. Thus, the 
chemical nature of water is taken to be a scientific fact; but 
as a fact, it needs to be discovered by experimental methods 
before it is shown to be true necessarily. There seems to be a 
clear-cut difference in the present controversy between Kant 
and Kripke and the opposition between Kant and logical pos-
itivists: in the latter case, the two sides agreed that experience 
has no role to play in the justification of arithmetic judgments; 
in the former case, however, Kripke claims that experience 
does contribute to the justification of analytic judgments. 
Isn’t there some misunderstanding here when it comes 
to the usual distinction between the origins of a concept and 
its justification? For if Kant accepted the empirical origin 
of concepts like numbers and operation signs, this does not 
mean that he thereby accepted the empirical foundation of 
an arithmetical identity such as “7 + 5 = 12”. In a nutshell, 
doesn’t Kripke, with his necessary aposteriority, reproduce 
the mistake made by John Stuart Mill? According to Mill 
(1974 [1843]), the empirical observation that adding seven 
apples to five oranges resulted in a set of twelve fruits was tak-
en to be an argument for the empirical foundation of mathe-
matics. Just as Frege (1980 [1884]) stressed this confusion be-
tween occasion and foundation, Kripke (1980) could equally 
be blamed for reproducing the same conceptual flaw. 
Yet this is not the case. I take this distinctive reception 
of Kripke’s hypothesis to rely upon a deep revision of what 
“analyticity” means. From a Kantian per ective, analytici-
ty is closely related to the categories of pure reason, i.e., to 
what stands in the a priori conditions of thought. No such 
transcendental analysis seems to be at hand in the Kripkean 
account of necessary a posteriori sentences: “Water is H
2
O” 
is a necessarily true sentence not in the light of pure reason 
but, rather, as a discovery holding in every world. Kantians 
must view rigid designators as a regressive emancipation of 
metaphysics from epistemology; in any case, the changes in 
analytic philosophy from Kripke (1980) to the two-dimension-
alism of Chalmers (2006) should be tolerated with re ect to 
the classification of desires too. 
Cancellation of Kant’s table
Recall how Quine also shook the ongoing debate around 
the distinction between analytic and synthetic. According to 
Quine (1951), there is no difference in nature but, rather, a 
mere difference in degree between these two kinds of judg-
ment. Mathematical and logical sentences are “more analyti-
cally true” than truths from empirical sciences, but there is no 






Table 4. The truth-table of logical conditional and its “forbidden” 
truth-condition.
the Kantian table of judgments. Besides, Quine claimed that 
Carnap’s distinction between “external” and “internal” ques-
tions relies upon an arbitrary distinction between facts and 
theories. Every true sentence has an empirical content, Quine 
argued, in the sense that true sentences always have a linguis-
tic and factual component. 
Whether Quine’s rejection of pure analyticity should be 
endorsed is not the point; rather, the controversy helps to call at-
tention to those who accept the Epicurean table unreflectively. 
Entailment
In any case, there is something common between the 
aforementioned tables: both locate the problem in row (2). 
A logical analysis shows that this corresponds to the issue of 
entailment.
Analogy III: Truth-table  
Another deep epistemological obstacle seems to justify 
the open consensus around Epicurus’ taxonomy of desires: 
the set-theoretical relation of inclusion between necessary 
and natural desires. A logical link with set theory is easily 
made through the connective of the conditional, which is 
said to approximate the relation of entailment. Little wonder 
that the Kantian table of judgment nicely matches with the 
truth-table chara erizing the logical connective of condition-
al, “if … then” (Table 4). 
The prohibited shaded row (2) is the case in which the 
antecedent p is true and the consequent q is false, in the con-
ditional sentence p ⊃ q. A logical interpretation of this table 
comes to the same result as a Kantian interpretation of ana-
lytic a posteriori judgments: it is impossible for the complex 
sentence p ⊃ q to be true whenever p is true and q is not true 
(i.e., false), just as it is impossible for a desire to be entertained 
whenever it is said to be necessary and not natural (i.e., cul-
tural). The same sort of inclusive relation is presupposed by 
Kant’s transcendental philosophy: no judgment can be ana-
lytically true and a posteriori at once, according to the Kan-
tian reading of analyticity in terms of the categories of pure 
reason inherent to human nature. Similarly, no desire can be 
necessary and cultural at once, according to the Epicurean 
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reading of necessity in terms of the properties inherent of hu-
man nature. Drug addiction cannot be said to be “necessary” 
in this sense: it is made necessary, and such a necessitation is 
not a feature of human nature at all but a mere by-product of 
cultural devolution.
By analogy, any disagreement about the content of the 
preceding table is a disagreement about the logical relation 
between its terms. On the one hand, the logicists think that 
there is no entailment but, rather, an equivalence or bi-condi-
tional relation between analyticity and a priority: whatever 
is analytic (or synthetic) is therefore a priori (or a posterio-
ri), and conversely; on the other hand, Kripke thinks that 
there is no logical connection at all between the two: wheth-
er a sentence is necessary (or not) entails nothing particular 
about its being a priori or a posteriori. Finally, Quine cancels 
the logical relation by refusing any single occurrence of an-
tecedent and consequent.
At any rate, whoever wants to break with the limits of 
Kant’s transcendental reason and opt for Kripke’s possible 
worlds should also tolerate the same stance with re ect to 
the limits of human nature. If so, why not extend necessity 
beyond the realm of naturalness, just as Kripke did by build-
ing a channel between necessity and aposteriority? 
Relative necessity
Nothing of this kind can be conceived with necessity, so 
long as the latter is associated with eternity. On the one hand, 
whatever is eternal is standing and cannot change, by oppo-
sition to the poietic feature of cultural things. On the other 
hand, the conjunction of necessity and culture can be validat-
ed if necessity is reduced to a relative or context-dependent 
sense of irrevocability. 
Borrowing from the Aristotelian distinction between 
relative (haplos) and absolute (katolou) forms of true predi-
cation, a logical truth is said to be either relative or absolute 
according to whether its truth depends on given premises or 
not. Syllogisms are relatively necessary truths, insofar as the 
conclusion cannot be validated without accepting at least 
two prior sentences. The same is held about theorems in 
modern logic: any given formula can be a theorem in this 
logical system and not a theorem in that one, as witnessed 
by “p or not p”: this is a theorem in classical logic, but not in 
intuitionist logic. 
Comparison is not reason, however, and an advocate 
of natural philosophy might reply that the way in which 
logicians handle necessity has nothing to do with the top-
ics that Epicurus dealt with. My reply, again, is that Kant’s 
concept of analyticity also differs from what Kripke meant 
by necessity: the former was in accordance with the epis-
temic categories of pure reason, whereas the latter con-
cerns metaphysical truth in every possible world. There-
fore, in the following I shall give a relative non-answer to 
the initial question: are there impossible desires, conceptu-
ally speaking? 
Necessitation
A relative sense of necessity implies that whatever has 
been accepted in the past cannot be modified afterwards, just 
like the rules of a game. Such an analogy with game theory 
echoes what Bouveresse (1987) has said about Wittgenstein’s 
language-game theory: quoting Goethe in his preface, Bou-
veresse compares the foundations of language games with the 
mysterious sources of human societies by depicting them as 
products of necessitated conventions. This quotation insists on a 
paradoxical link between necessity and conventionality: con-
vention is a product of contingent decision, and whatever is 
contingent cannot be necessary, by definition. The explana-
tion is this: conventions are contingent by definition; how-
ever, they are made necessary or necessitated once accepted 
within a given area of study: language, with Wittgenstein; 
mind, with Epicurus.
An ultimate epistemological obstacle has to be over-
come in order to proceed with desires as Kripke did with 
judgments: the view that human nature is given once and for 
all independently of human cultures, just as Kant located 
analytic judgments beyond particular experience. Anyone 
who has sympathy for transhumanism should make the jump 
without difficulty. But it can be done without even assuming 
such a metaphysical stance. 
Three cases for cultural necessitation will now be sug-
ge ed, namely: neurotic desires; mimetic desires; taboos, as a 
negative version of necessitated “counter-desires”.
In Freud (1991 [1916])’s theory of the unconscious mind, 
“the ego is not the master in its own house”. According to Freud, 
this is due to the opposition between two instances of mind, 
viz. conscious and unconscious. Whether or not psychoanaly-
sis is a reliable theory is not the point; rather, the explanatory 
role of neuroses is that they give an example of unnatural de-
sires that are formed after birth and through the negative ef-
fect of repressive education. If such uncontrollable desires are 
accepted as neuroses, then there are some desires that are both 
impossible for the agent to restrain and non-natural. 
Following Girard (1966), desire is an essentially mimetic 
process: far from the naturalistic picture given by Epicurus, 
some desires result from a triangular relationship between 
the owner’s desired object, the object itself, and the desiring 
agent. Desire has thus been made necessary by socialization, 
and everyone desires what another has. Such a cogent the-
ory helps to account for current human behaviors like se-
duction or consumption. La Rochefoucauld (2002 [1665], n. 
136) summarizes it in the following words: “There are some 
people who would never have fallen in love if they had not 
heard there was such a thing”. Anyone who admits the prom-
inence of such social desires may object to their necessity, in 
the sense of their being inherent to human nature. But still, it 
can be accepted by anyone who sees an impetus in them that 
cannot be cancelled out by the social conditions of life.
Finally, a reverse form of cultural necessity may be found 
in taboos. Following Lévi-Strauss (1969 [1949]), taboos can 
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be seen as a third example of what socialization may make 
necessary through the force of education, after Freud’s neu-
roses and Girard’s desires of desires. In fact, taboos proceed 
as counter-desires: they are feelings produced by prohibited 
rules in a given community, and the stronger they are the more 
natural they appear. Disgust provoked by the incest taboo, for 
example, is a feeling where agents do more than merely not 
desire something: they desire not to do what is made shame-
ful by the tacit rules of the community. Therefore, anthropol-
ogy and psychoanalysis jointly argue for the necessitation of 
some desires under the impetus of socialization, whether in a 
positive sense of lust or a negative sense of reluctance.
Conclusion
I have attempted to make room for an allegedly concep-
tual impossibility: necessary and non-natural desires, start-
ing from the ancient classification of Epicurus. By means of 
a comparison with the controversial Kantian table of judg-
ments, what entitled Kripke to justify the fourth “forbidden” 
kind of judgments should equally make the fourth kind of de-
sires conceivable. 
And yet, why has the latter never been even mentioned 
in the philosophical literature? It may be because of the com-
monsensical opinion that nothing necessary can stand out-
side the range of natural things. Such entrenched opinion has 
to face the arguments above regarding necessitation. It may 
also be because this fourth combination goes beyond the defi-
nition afforded by Epicurus in his theory of desires. If a whole 
philosophy of nature is implied by this classification, then no 
desire can be said to be both necessary and non-natural. The 
commonsensical opinion is much stronger, suggesting that 
such desires are barely unconceivable whether inside or out-
side of Epicurus’ theory. 
Did Kripke defeat common opinion about analyticity 
and aposteriority, if there is one? Or did he only make sense 
of such combined judgments outside of Kant’s philosophy? 
This is what follows from his non-Kantian definition of an-
alyticity, after the first amendment of the concept by logical 
positivists. This is what has been undertaken in the present 
paper, thereby showing that what is said to be impossible is 
not so inconceivable after all.
In fact, the central problem concerns the conditions for 
making sense of an idea inside or outside of a philosophical 
system. Is the occurrence of necessary and cultural desires an 
external or internal question? Quineans should question the 
very distinction between what a concept means inside and 
outside of a philosophical system. 
Are there non-Epicurean desires, in conclusion? Not im-
possibly, at any rate.
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